David Warsh: Invasion of Iraq was America's 21st Century original sin

U.S. soldiers at the Hands of Victory monument in Baghdad during the invasion of Iraq in  2003.

SOMERVILLE, Mass.

Fourteen years ago today, a U.S.-dominated coalition of forces began bombing Baghdad.  The U.S. had demanded that Saddam Hussein leave Iraq within 48 hours.  When he didn’t, coalition forces attempted to kill him and his sons in the first hour of their “shock and awe” bombing campaign, beginning the morning of March 19, 2003.  George W. Bush went on television that evening to describe the purpose the war to follow: “to disarm Iraq, to free its people, and to defend the world from grave danger.”

The invasion of Iraq was the fulcrum on which much has shifted since.  Vladimir Putin’s speech in February 2007 to the Munich Conference on Security Policy dissented sharply from Washington’s vision of a unipolar world and warned against further NATO expansion along Russia’s southern borders.

The “Arab Spring,” beginning in Tunisia in late 2010 (“gripped by the narrative of a young generation peacefully rising up against oppressive authoritarianism to secure a more democratic political system and a brighter economic future,” in one interpretation), swept through Egypt, Libya, Yemen and Syria with profoundly mixed results.

The Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) found its footing in the villages and towns along upper Euphrates and Tigris rivers, accelerating the European refugee crisis and contributing to Britain’s vote to leave the European Union. The fall of a friendly government in Kiev in 2013 led to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and civil war in Ukraine. The financial crisis of 2008-09 proceeded separately, contributing greatly to the strain.

The disaster in Iraq is well understood. The best book I know on the war itself is Overreach: Delusions of Regime Change in Iraq (Harvard, 2014), by Michael MacDonald.  The broader context is well covered in America’s War for the Greater Middle East: A Military History (Random House, 2016), by Andrew Bacevich. Rise of the Vulcans: The History of Bush’s War Cabinet (Viking, 2004), by James Mann, traces its origins to the experience of America’s defeat in Vietnam.

Yet like a repressed bad dream, the decision to invade Iraq is routinely overlooked as a landmark event.  George W. recanted only in joking. Solidarity with his brother helped cost Jeb Bush a primary campaign he was expected to win. Hillary Clinton’s slippery views on Iraq counted against her in the recent election and almost certainly cost her the 2008 Democratic nomination. And Donald Trump, skewered when he claimed he had opposed the war before it started, has scarcely mentioned it since.

As for the newspapers, the editorial board of The Wall Street Journal still thinks that the war was a great idea.  The Washington Post has renounced its zest for the war only a little.  Even The New York Times has trouble remembering the role its coverage played in fomenting the war.  Economicprincipals.com, my Web site, still burns with shame.

The U.S. made various mistakes in the 1990s, when it stood alone as the as the world’s dominant power, but there is a sense in which invasion of Iraq was the 21st Century's original sin, costing credibility around the world – never mind the lives of 5,000 of its soldiers, those of at least half a million Iraqis, and some $3 trillion so far. Until the U.S. comes to terms with its miscalculation, it can expect to misunderstand and be misunderstood

The aftermath of the war is central to today’s controversy with Russia. And with Secretary of State Rex Tillerson warning of a much harder line against North Korea, it could hardly be more relevant.  Let March 19 become a national day of reflection.

David Warsh, a longtime columnist on economic, political and media affairs, is proprietor of economicprincipals.com, where this first ran.

Amanda Ufheil-Somers: Bombing I.S. will make matters worse

Once again, a U.S. president vows to eliminate an extremist militia in the Middle East to make the region, and Americans, safe.

And that means it’s time again for a reality check. Having failed in its bid to destroy the Taliban and al-Qaida in Afghanistan, the United States is still trying to dismantle both organizations. Over  13 years of war, that mission has spread to Syria, Iraq, Yemen, Somalia, Libya, Mali and West Africa, as militant groups on two continents have adopted the al-Qaida brand.

Contrary to normal logic, the White House wants everyone to see this failure as a badge of expertise. As President Obama vowed in an interview on Meet the Press, fighting the Islamic State forces “is something we know how to do,” mainly because we’ve been battling similar groups “for five, six, seven years.”

Years of air strikes, drone-operated killings and covert operations have brought neither peace nor safety to the region and its people. Estimates of the death toll from U.S. attacks in Pakistan, Yemen, and Somalia alone range from 3,100 to 5,400, including 570-1,200 civilians. Precise figures are impossible to obtain since the strikes remain classified, and investigating drone attacks is difficult and dangerous work.

Nor has the drone campaign halted the proliferation of groups seeking to link their — usually local — agendas to the idea of a global struggle represented by al-Qaida. Indiscriminate killing — and the constant fear of death from above — has only destroyed communities and provided easy recruitment material for extremist groups.

Obama promises that his plan to combat and destroy the Islamic State forces will also address the underlying political problems in Iraq and Syria. Such claims are tenuous, at best. What’s far more certain is that all military campaigns have unintended consequences, some of which don’t appear for many years afterward.

The Islamic State itself is largely a product of the U.S. invasion and occupation of Iraq. Dismantling the Iraqi state and rebuilding it along sectarian lines produced an authoritarian government dominated by Shiite Islamists who ignored minority grievances and often suppressed dissent with bullets. The result? An entrenched civil war with no end in sight.

Although U.S. media coverage of the violence in Iraq subsided following the withdrawal of combat troops, sectarian attacks against civilians have continued. Car bombs, street assaults, and kidnappings have transformed Baghdad into a city segregated by sect. Large parts of the country, including the Sunni majority areas in the west and north, feel abandoned by the central government.

These political tensions are the reason why the Islamic State has found some support in the areas it has taken over. Bombing Islamic State targets — especially where they are embedded in communities and liable to cause civilian casualties — carries no promise of changing this dynamic for the better. It’s more likely to change it for the worse.

The Islamic State is indeed a danger to the people of the region and to efforts to resolve the political conflicts in Iraq and Syria. Yet the past decade has shown, again and again, that American firepower doesn’t solve these problems. Even if Washington manages to help destroy this al-Qaida spinoff, the grievances that give rise to groups like it can’t be bombed out of existence.

The campaign formerly called “the War on Terror” has only proven to perpetuate both war and terror. No amount of rebranding or wishful thinking will change that reality this time around.

Amanda Ufheil-Somers is the assistant editor of Middle East Report, published by the Middle East Research and Information Project. MERIP.org. This is distributed via OtherWords.org.